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Abstract
Warrantless arrest laws for domestic violence (DV) are generally classified
as discretionary, preferred, or mandatory, based on the level of power
accorded to police in deciding whether to arrest. However, there is a
lack of consensus in the literature regarding how each state’s law should
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be categorized. Using three classification schemes, this study examined
whether variations among these schemes impact research outcomes by
analyzing the effects of discretionary, preferred, and mandatory warrantless
arrest laws on intimate partner homicide (IPH). Variations in classification
schemes and in the dates of law passage presented in the literature resulted
in differing estimated effects of the laws.
Keywords
domestic violence, warrantless arrest laws, homicide, classification systems
Introduction
Since the late 1970s, state statutes allowing police officers to make warrant-
less arrests of alleged perpetrators of domestic violence (DV) given probable
cause have proliferated across the United States. These laws have been con-
troversial since their inception, and there aremultiple conflicting hypotheses
regarding their effects on DV victims, perpetrators, and outcomes. A review
of the literature reveals that researchers are not in agreement on how to
define and classify these laws. Due to a lack of consensus regarding how
DV warrantless arrest laws are classified, as well as data limitations and
modeling difficulties, the existing research on these laws is insufficient to
reach firm conclusions about their effects.
Arguably, the most salient aspect of DV warrantless arrest laws is the
amount of discretion a police officer has in making the decision to arrest,
which varies considerably from state to state. In the generally accepted
typology of DV warrantless arrest laws, there are three tiers of decision-
making power: full discretion (heretofore referred to as discretionary arrest
laws); discretion with the state indicating a preference for arrest (preferred
arrest laws); and little to no discretion (mandatory arrest laws). However,
there is a lack of consensus in the literature as to how each state’s law
should be categorized under this typology, leading to discrepancies between
law classification schemes used in the research. Little is known about the
effects of DV warrantless arrest laws on outcomes such as DV perpetration,
recidivism or injury, and the use of differing classification schemes in
research complicates the interpretation and integration of the few existing
research findings in this area. This article will attempt to isolate the effects
of using differing law typologies on research outcomes. Using three classi-
fication schemes found in the literature, this study seeks to discern whether
variations in such classification schemes impact research outcomes by
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analyzing the effects of discretionary, preferred, and mandatory warrantless
arrest laws on intimate partner homicide (IPH).
The effects of DV warrantless arrest laws, particularly those termed
mandatory arrest laws, are important to discern because there exists a
controversy over the usefulness and appropriateness of these laws. Whether
mandatory arrest laws will ultimately reduce the incidence of DV, have no
effect on DV, or have unintended negative consequences, such as an
increase in dual arrests or even IPH, is yet unknown. The answers to this
question have clear policy implications. The debate over mandatory arrest
laws is summarized below.
The DV warrantless arrest laws examined here are triggered when
someone, usually the victim or a third party, calls the police to report a
DV event. They allow police officers to arrest a suspected perpetrator of
DV without a warrant even if they did not witness the event; laws exist
allowing police officers to make warrantless arrests for restraining order
violations as well, however, this research focuses specifically on warrant-
less arrests for the crime of DV. In states with laws that include a mandatory
arrest component, a police officer may believe that arrest is necessary upon
a finding of probable cause, and therefore arrest. This may occur regardless
of the unique circumstances of the case, including whether the victim
requests that an arrest not be made. If the state law indicates a preference for
arrest, a police officer may arrest more often than not but take the circum-
stances of the cases into consideration to some degree. If the state has what
is viewed as a discretionary arrest law, a police officermay take any of a num-
ber of factors into consideration in deciding whether arrest is or is not an
appropriate action.
Presumably then, mandatory and preferred arrest laws will result in
increased arrest rates in comparison with discretionary arrest laws, a premise
generally supported by research (Hirschel et al. 2007; Simpson et al. 2006).
Using a cross-sectional design and data from the National Incident Based
Reporting System for 19 states in the year 2000, Hirschel et al. (2007) found
that the presence of mandatory or preferred arrest laws increased arrest rates
for DV incidents. While the research controlled for many factors, including
offender demographics and incident seriousness, they were unable to control
for other factors that may increase the propensity of police officers to arrest
for DV, such as specialized training. Furthermore, the cross-sectional design
of the research does not allow investigation into the temporal association
between the laws and arrest rates; it is possible that states that are less tolerant
of DV are both more likely to have high arrest rates for DV and to enact
stricter arrest laws.
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It is argued that mandatory arrest laws result in a more consistent and
punitive response to DV by police officers, who, upon a finding of probably
cause, lack the power to make the decision not to arrest; this sends a mes-
sage that DV is a crime that will not be tolerated (Stark 1993). This message
could help to transform society’s attitudes toward and decrease tolerance for
DV, thereby leading to an eventual reduction in DV. Furthermore, it is
hypothesized that simply increasing the risk and severity of criminal
sanctions, such as arrest, will protect victims from harm by deterring perpe-
trators from future acts of violence (see Williams 2005 for a discussion on
deterrence theory, arrest for DV, and the state of the research).
However, there is concern that mandatory or preferred arrest laws have
lead to an increase in arrests of DV victims, either singly or as part of dual
arrests (circumstances in which both parties are arrested). Indeed, in their
research Hirschel et al. (2007) found that the increased arrest rate in states
with mandatory arrest laws was attributable, at least in part, to an increase in
the arrest of females, who comprise the majority of DV victims, both as part
of dual arrests and single arrests. These arrests may have the effects of
punishing victims; legitimizing perpetrators; and discouraging victims from
further contacting the police, which could encourage violence.
Because mandatory arrest statutes promote a consistent police response
to DV, they may be seen as rigid laws that do not permit police officers to
decide on the appropriate course of action given the unique circumstances
of each situation and instead prescribe a ‘‘cookie-cutter’’ approach to all DV
cases. This may put the laws at odds with police officers’ preferences.
A survey of police officers revealed that they desire more discretion in
DV cases, believing that they are capable of appropriately determining
when an arrest is necessary (Toon et al. 2005). Not everyone agrees that
mandatory arrest laws disallow police discretion, however. Hoctor (1997)
points out that arrest still requires a police officer’s determination of probable
cause, thereby granting a level of discretion to the police officer even under
the strictest mandatory arrest law. Furthermore, many state statutes that
appear to mandate arrest have a level of discretion built into them beyond the
determination of probable cause; for example, the Nevada statute states
that arrest is mandatory ‘‘unless mitigating circumstances exist’’ (Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §171.137). Presumably, a police officer must decide both what
constitutes a ‘‘mitigating circumstance’’ and whether that circumstance
exists to determine whether an arrest must be made under the law.
If it is well-advertised to the public that the law requires a police officer
to arrest for DV, providing a level of discretion in what is viewed as a man-
datory arrest law may have unintended negative consequences. If the victim
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calls the police expecting them to arrest the alleged perpetrator but they do
not, the victim may believe the police do not view her safety as a priority or
that they do not believe her claims of victimization. Much like arresting the
victim, failure to arrest the perpetrator when the victim expects arrest
may legitimize the perpetrator and discourage the victim from subsequently
contacting the police.
Police officers are not the only group to whom mandatory arrest laws
limit choice. Mandatory arrest policies remove choice from victims by
directing officers not to take the victims’ arrest preferences into account.
This can be argued as a positive or negative feature of these laws. It can
be viewed as negative because victims may not want their perpetrators
arrested; some may simply want to stop the violent events at hand.
For example, in a study of DV victims in one Alabama county (a state that
researchers agree has a discretionary arrest law; Hirschel et al. 2007;
Iyengar 2009; Miller 2004) who called the police, some indicated that they
called with the goal of ending the abuse in mind but did not want the perpe-
trators of the abuse arrested (Johnson 2007). Furthermore, a victim may not
want her perpetrator arrested because she fears retaliation from her perpe-
trator for the arrest. If an arrest occurs against the victim’s expressed
wishes, she may believe she is not being listened to and her concerns, par-
ticularly those of retaliatory violence, are not being taken seriously (Rajah,
Frye, and Haviland 2006). As the dynamic of DV is one in which the victim
is disempowered by her perpetrator, further removing the victim’s agency
by substituting the state’s judgment for her own may compound the problem
(Mills 1999).
In fact, researchers have argued that victim preference should be consid-
ered in the decision to arrest. In a study conducted in the discretionary arrest
state (Hirschel et al. 2007; Iyengar 2009; Miller 2004) of North Carolina,
Hirschel and Hutchison (2003) found that victim preference for offender
arrest was associated with a greater likelihood of revictimization. Victims
who were at a high risk of future victimization were more likely to want
their perpetrators arrested and, conversely, those who did not desire arrest
were less likely to be revictimized. Because a victim’s preference for arrest
predicts future violence, and because her preference is predicated upon
many elements that the police consider relevant in decisions to arrest,
Hirschel and Hutchison (2003) concluded that the police should take victim
arrest preferences into account to determine whether arrest is the appropriate
option.
Yet, removing victim choice is also seen as a positive feature of mandatory
arrest laws. There is a belief that forcing victims to request or advocate for
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arrest, as they often must under discretionary laws, may increase the risk of
retaliatory violence by the perpetrator (Rajah, Frye, and Haviland 2006).
Mandatory arrest laws remove the responsibility for the perpetrator’s arrest
from the victim, who can truthfully say that she had no influence on the
decision to arrest. Removing this responsibility can hypothetically reduce
the risk of retaliation against the victim for a perpetrator’s arrest.
In sharp contrast to the hypothesis that mandatory arrest laws may reduce
violence, one of the few research studies on violent outcomes associated
with warrantless arrest laws for DV found evidence to suggest that, at the
state level, mandatory arrest laws for DV increased the risk of IPH (Iyengar
2009). Iyengar hypothesized that mandatory arrest laws may increase IPH
because they may lead victims who do not want their partners arrested to
be less willing to call the police, and thereby not receive the protective
effects of police involvement. Unlike much social science research,
Iyengar’s research findings were presented in the popular press and were
noted by several advocacy groups that have called for the repeal of manda-
tory arrest laws (see, for example, Alliance for Non-Custodial Parents
Rights 2007; Harris 2007; Iyengar 2007; PR Newswire 2010; Rosenthal
2007). Due to the similarity of Iyengar’s methodology and our own, a cri-
tique of this methodology is found in the Discussion section of this article.
Given the controversy surrounding mandatory arrest laws for DV, and
their possible negative consequences, it is vitally important that we examine
the existing literature in terms of its limitations and ability to make causal
statements. Many limitations, including limitations of the available data,
omitted variable bias, and modeling procedures, particularly data-driven
model selection (Leeb and Potscher 2005), plague research of this nature;
these limitations have been acknowledged in regards to the death penalty
literature (Donohue and Wolfers 2009). Unfortunately, by varying model
specification and selection choices, the production of differing estimates
of policy effects is facilitated (Donohue and Wolfers 2009; Leeb and
Potscher 2005), leading some to the conclusion that we are far from being
able to arrive at a valid answer to the question of whether a certain policy
reduces homicide. However, as these modeling difficulties have been
discussed at length, our focus here is on the contribution of varying law
classification schemes to the problem of determining whether discretionary,
preferred, or mandatory DV warrantless arrest laws affect IPH levels, and
not on model specification problems per se.
The current state of the literature is one in which multiple classification
schemes exist for the arrest law typology based on police power to arrest,
further complicating the integration of research results, and making it
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difficult to draw conclusions. A body of research that is inconsistent in
which laws are considered ‘‘mandatory’’ impedes our understanding of the
effects of these laws. It is possible that, for any given research question and
study on the effects of these laws, differing classification schemes result in
differing outcomes. To use information from the research in advocacy or
policymaking, onemust be clear aboutwhat precisely ismeant by the construct
‘‘mandatory arrest law.’’
To address the research question of whether research results depend
upon the arrest law classification scheme used, the present research tests
three classification schemes based on the amount of discretion police offi-
cers have to arrest. To explore this larger question, we conducted research
designed to examine a variant of the question posed by Iyengar (2009): do
discretionary, preferred, and mandatory warrantless arrest laws for DV
impact IPH risk?
Method
To estimate the association between discretionary, preferred, andmandatory
arrest laws and IPH risk, we used a panel data design comprised of 46 of the
largest cities in the United States. from 1979 to 2006. While this limited our
sample of states to 25, we retained a relatively representative mix of states
with discretionary, preferred, and mandatory arrest laws under each of the
three tested law classification schemes.We employed the same basic statis-
tical approach as Iyengar (2009) in order to facilitate comparisons of model
results.
Dependent Variables
Our main dependent variables, counts of total, female, and male IPH
victims aged 15 years and above, were constructed using data from the
Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR; Fox and Swatt 2009). Replicating
Iyengar’s (2009) approach, we created two sets of IPH victim count vari-
ables. The first set was comprised of counts of victims whose relationships
with perpetrators were that of current or former spouse or common-law
spouse. These dependent variables are referred to as ‘‘covered’’ IPH
because at aminimum, all of the state arrest laws under study coveredmarital
relationships, though what constitutes common-law marriage and whether
this is covered by state law is not entirely clear (Iyengar 2009).
Some states included or expanded the coverage of their DV laws to
include intimate relationships such as dating or same-gender relationships.
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We therefore constructed a second set of dependent variables of total,
female, andmale IPH victimization counts that included all possible intimate
relationships identified by the SHR (hereafter referred to as ‘‘all’’ IPH).
Even for state laws that do not cover dating or same-gender relationships,
it is possible that there may be a spillover effect of mandatory or preferred
arrest laws into these relationships: if police have the power to make war-
rantless arrests for misdemeanors they did not witness for intimate relation-
ships not covered by DV laws, then the presence of laws favoring arrest for
DVmay lead them to favor arrest for DV cases without qualifying intimate
relationships as well. Such a spillover effect was seen in research by
Hirschel et al. (2007) which found that arrests increased for nonintimate
relationships in states that had mandatory arrest laws for DV. Therefore,
DV arrest laws may affect dating and same-gender relationships even if
they do not cover them.
While research suggests an increase in arrests for nonintimate relation-
ships in response to DV mandatory arrest laws, it is not thought that these
laws will have a significant impact on nonintimate homicide. Therefore, we
used counts of all non-DV homicides as a nonequivalent dependent variable
for a robustness test to determine whether omitted factors confound our
results.
Given the limitations of the SHR regarding underreporting, we adjusted
each of the dependent variables using the procedure described in Dugan,
Nagin, and Rosenfeld (2001), which adjusts the SHR counts upwards by the
inverse of the proportion of total SHR homicide victim counts to Uniform
Crime Reports (UCR) homicide counts when that proportion is less than 1.
Independent Variables
Research publications laying out classification schemes for aDVwarrantless
arrest law typology based on discretion to arrest are rare. We chose three
schemes from the literature for which we found adequate information to
reconstruct the law categorization. These three law classification schemes
were defined in the literature by Iyengar (2009), Hirschel et al. (2007), and
Miller (2004). For ease, we call these classifications A, B, and C, respec-
tively. While each of these classification schemes were used to produce sep-
arate dichotomous variables indicating the presence of a mandatory,
preferred, or discretionary arrest law in a city-year, with the reference group
being those city-years where no lawwas in place, the decision regarding how
to model the timing of the law was complicated by the information included,
or not, in the literature.
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Classification A is based on the work of Iyengar (2009), which listed the
year of law passage and categorization for states deemed as having either
mandatory or preferred arrest laws. For the present research, the state laws
not listed as mandatory or preferred were considered discretionary. In the
publications from which we created classifications B (Hirschel et al.
2007) and C (Miller 2004), all state laws were labeled as either discretionary,
preferred, ormandatory; however, neither publication contained information
on the year of law passage or implementation.
Using information from session laws, we determined the implementation
date of each law. For classifications B and C, we coded the dichotomous
law variables as 1 for the first city-year for which the law was implemented
for more than 6 months and all city-years thereafter, and as 0 otherwise.
When we compared the years of law passage collected from our legal research
with those published in Iyengar (2009),we noted somediscrepancies.Wecould
not simply base our modeling of classification A’s law variables on the col-
lected implementation dates because some of those implementation dates
occurred before the year of law passage published in Iyengar (2009). For this
reason, we modeled the law variables for classification A in two ways. First,
we coded the dichotomous law variables as 1 for the first city-year after the law
was passed and all city-years thereafter, and as 0 otherwise.Theyear of lawpas-
sage was supplied by Iyengar (2009) for mandatory and preferred arrest laws,
and by our legal research for the discretionary laws (for which Iyengar 2009
publishedno information).Thismanner ofmodeling the timingof classification
A laws is referred to asA1. Second, we coded the dichotomous law variables as
1 for the first city-year for which the law was implemented for more than 6
months and all city-years thereafter, and as 0 otherwise, based on imple-
mentation dates collected by our legal research. This is referred to as A2.
We chose to model classification A as we did because it is possible that
Iyengar’s interpretation of the law rests on a different law section, with a
different implementation date, than does our interpretation. The first coding
scheme, which rests on Iyengar’s years of passage, reflects this possibility
and is also the manner in which Iyengar represented her law variables
(2009). The second coding scheme more precisely models whether the
law was present in a given city-year, and allows us to directly compare
outcomes given differing law classification schemes by removing variabil-
ity in law timing between schemes.
As the three coding schemes were developed by the original researchers
based on the laws as they read in the year 2000 or later, and the most recent
state law change relevant to this research occurred in the year 2000, we
were confident that we had up-to-date law classifications.
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We controlled for numerous city-year and state-year factors that are
potentially associated with the incidence of DV and DV responses and may
in turn affect the IPH rate. We controlled for city crime levels using city-
level rates for violent and nonviolent crimes as calculated from the FBI’s
UCR (U.S. Dept. of Justice 2007), as well as the city-level adjusted adult,
nonintimate homicide rate as calculated with data from the SHR (Fox and
Swatt 2009).1 We also controlled for the ratio of prisoners under state and
federal jurisdiction per population in a state (Bureau of Justice Statistics
2005) and legality of the death penalty in a state (Death Penalty Information
Center 2009). Economic conditions such as the city-level log of personal
income per capita and the ratio of females to males aged 16 and over who
were employed, and state-level unemployment rates, as taken from the
decennial U.S. Census (U.S. Census Bureau 1973, 1981, 1991, 2001), were
also controlled for. In addition, we included the social policy controls of
the averageAid to Families with Dependent Children/TemporaryAssistance
for Needy Families (AFDC/TANF) payment for a family of four in a state
(Committee on Ways and Means 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004) and presence of
unilateral divorce laws (Gruber 2004).
We reduced omitted variable bias by controlling for differences between
cities that may affect the IPH rate with city fixed effects, and differences
from year to year that may affect the IPH rate on a national level with year
fixed effects. We also tested a linear time trend to control for factors that
caused the IPH rate to change nationally over time, and we allowed city
trends to vary over time by interacting the city fixed effects with the linear
trend term.
Statistical Method
Krippendorff’s a scores were calculated for each two-way comparison of
law classification schemes both for the sample of states under study and for
all states for the year 2000 alone. We also inspected the text of the publica-
tions and the laws to determine where discrepancies in construct explication
or law assessment lay.
To estimate the association between arrest laws and IPH counts, we
considered both Poisson and negative binomial regression models.
The Poisson models ultimately proved a better fit. Our unit of analysis was
the city-year and we used the natural logarithm of the population at risk as
the offset for the models: the offset for the models of total IPH was therefore
the natural logarithm of the total population aged 15 years and above for
each city-year; the offsets for the models of male IPH and female IPH were
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the natural logarithms of the totals of the male and female populations aged
15 years and above, respectively. Because we took repeated measures of
each city across time, autocorrelation was a threat to statistical validity.
To correct for the effect of autocorrelation of the IPH counts on estimated
standard errors, we used generalized estimating equations (GEE), clustering
on cities. We used the standard criteria of p value <.05 for a two-tailed test
to denote significance.
Preliminary analyses were run to separately test the effect of each control
variable on the two dependent variables of total covered IPH counts and all
IPH counts. The models also included city fixed effects, a linear time trend,
and city-specific linear trend variables. Those control variables with a
p value >.10 for both models were dropped from the analysis, resulting in
the removal of AFDC/TANF benefits, unilateral divorce law, and death
penalty policy variables. It should be noted that the inclusion of these
variables in the models did not produce substantially different estimates.
Preliminary analyses were also run to test the effects of the arrest law dummy
variables on total covered IPH counts, again controlling only for city fixed
effects, a linear time trend, and city-specific linear trend variables.
Endogeneity through feedback (in this case, the concept that the passages
of the arrest policies depend in part on IPH levels) is not thought to bias the
research estimates as DV warrantless arrest laws are not believed to have
been passed in response to changes in IPH levels. In fact, the history of how
warrantless arrest laws for DV perpetration proliferated across the United
States has been well-documented (see, for example, Buzawa and Buzawa
1993) as depending upon the growing women’s rights movement that agi-
tated for DV to be viewed as a crime; a political climate in which the
populace and lawmakers favored more punitive measures for offenders;
high-profile court cases against jurisdictions, such as Thurman v. the City
of Torrington (1984) in which a victim of DV successfully sued the city for
not giving her equal protection under the law; and an influential research
experiment that suggested that perpetrators of DV were less likely to reci-
divate when they were randomly assigned to the arrest versus standard
response groups (Sherman and Berk 1984). Therefore, no additional mea-
sures were employed to control for endogeneity.
Results
For both the sample of study states and all states for the year 2000, interrater
agreement as assessed by Krippendorff’s a was fair between classifications
A and B and classifications A and C, and excellent between classifications
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B and C (see Table 1), although agreement was somewhat lower for the
sample of study states. An analysis of the text of the publications showed
that the three classification schemes used in this research seem to have sim-
ilar classification criteria, but, for several state laws, differing assessments
of whether those criteria apply. The small amount of text devoted to
describing the law classification criteria in the publications makes it
difficult to discern the reason for differences in the construct explications.
What is apparent is that classification A diverged from classifications B and
C in arguably substantial and potentially important ways.
Table 2 shows precisely how the law classification schemes categorize
each state’s law, and therefore how the classifications differ. For classifica-
tion A, the year of passage included in Iyengar (2009) is also listed.
A discrepancy between classification A’s year of passage and ours is indi-
cated by presenting our year of passage in parentheses and italics next to the
classification A year of passage. Study states are indicated with an asterisk.
At least some of the discrepancy between the years of passage provided by
classification A and those provided by our legal research may be due to
classification A’s examination of a passage of the law other than that
describing police arrest powers for DV cases. For example, the passage
of the California law cited (Cal. Penal Code §836(c)(1)) describes police
powers to make a warrantless arrest for restraining order violation, and not
for the more general crime of DV.
The results of the main models are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
The estimates produced using classification C are not presented because
they were nearly identical to those produced using classification B. Table 3
lists the incidence rate ratios (IRRs) and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for
the preliminarymodels, and the covered total IPH, covered female IPH, and
coveredmale IPHmodels (Models 1 through 4, respectively). The results of
the preliminary analysis of arrest law effects on covered total IPH indicate
that while the differences in the law classification schemes included in the
research influence the estimated effects of the laws, the more substantial
differences in estimated effects were based on how the timing of the laws
Table 1. Interrater Agreement Between Law Coding Schemes for the Study States
and for all States for the Year 2000
Krippendorff’s a for Study States Krippendorff’s a for all States
A and B .537 .581
A and C .475 .525
B and C .871 .904
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Table 2. Law Categorization by State and Classification Scheme for all States
State Classification A Classification B Classification C
AL Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
AK Mandatory 1996 Mandatory Mandatory
AZ* Recommended 1991 Mandatory Mandatory
AR Discretionary Preferred Preferred
CA* Recommended 1993 (1996) Preferred Preferred
CO* Mandatory 1994 Mandatory Mandatory
CT Mandatory 1987 (1986) Mandatory Mandatory
DC Mandatory 1991 Mandatory Mandatory
DE Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
FL Discretionary Discretionary Preferred
GA* Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
HI* Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
ID Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
IL* Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
IN* Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
IA Mandatory 1990 (1986) Mandatory Mandatory
KS Recommended 2000 (1984) Mandatory Mandatory
KY Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
LA* Discretionary Mandatory Mandatory
ME Mandatory 1995 (1979) Mandatory Mandatory
MD* Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
MA* Discretionary Preferred Preferred
MI* Discretionary Discretionary Preferred
MN* Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
MS Recommended 1995 Mandatory Mandatory
MO* Recommended 1989 Mandatory Discretionary for first inci
dent; mandatory for sec
ond incident within 12 hr
MT Discretionary Preferred Preferred
NE Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
NV Mandatory 1989 (1985) Mandatory Mandatory
NH Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary and preferred
NJ Mandatory 1991 Mandatory Mandatory
NM* Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
NY* Recommended 1994 Mandatory Mandatory
NC* Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
ND Discretionary Preferred Preferred
OH* Recommended 1994 Mandatory Mandatory
OK* Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
(continued)
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were modeled. For classification A1, both the mandatory and preferred
warrantless arrest laws were associated with a decrease in covered total
IPH risk (IRR: 0.60, 95% CI: 0.51, 0.71; IRR: 0.82, 95% CI: 0.68, 0.99,
respectively). Using classifications A2, B, or C, no significant law effects
were found.
The results of Models 2 and 3 are similar. Under classification A1, the
mandatory arrest law is estimated to reduce covered total IPH (IRR: 0.70,
95% CI: 0.57, 0.86) and covered female IPH (IRR: 0.79, 95% CI: 0.68,
0.93); however, neither preferred nor discretionary arrest laws were
estimated to impact covered total or covered female IPH. The direction
of the point estimate for the effect of mandatory arrest laws differs between
classification A1, in which the IRR suggests a negative relationship, and
classifications A2, B, and C, in which the IRRs suggest a positive relation-
ship. Under classifications A2, B, and C, none of the DV warrantless arrest
laws had a significantly different effect from no DV warrantless arrest law.
However, the direction of the point estimate for the effect of preferred arrest
laws differs between classification A2 and those of classifications B and C.
Under classification A1 in Model 4, mandatory arrest laws are associated
with a 68% decrease in covered male IPH (IRR: 0.32, 95% CI: 0.14, 0.76),
Table 2 (continued)
State Classification A Classification B Classification C
OR* Mandatory 2001 (1977) Mandatory Mandatory
PA* Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
RI Mandatory 2000 (1988) Mandatory Mandatory
SC Recommended 2002 (1995) Mandatory Mandatory
SD Mandatory 1998 (1989) Mandatory Mandatory
TN* Discretionary Preferred Preferred
TX* Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
UT Mandatory 2000 (1995) Mandatory Mandatory
VT Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
VA* Mandatory 2002 (1996) Mandatory Mandatory
WA* Mandatory 1999 (1984) Mandatory Mandatory
WV Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
WI* Mandatory 1996 (1987) Mandatory Mandatory
WY Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
Note: A discrepancy between Classification A’s year of passage and ours is indicated by presenting
our year of passage in parentheses and italics next to the Classification A year of passage.
*State included in the study.
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whereas the estimated relationships of mandatory arrest laws to covered
male IPH under classifications A2, B, and C are negative but not significant.
Preferred and discretionary arrest laws are not estimated to impact the risk
of covered male IPH under any of the law classifications, and the point esti-
mates are positive for all but the relationship between preferred arrest laws
under classification A1 and covered male IPH.
Table 4 lists the estimated effects of the laws on all IPH, all female IPH,
all male IPH, and all non-DV homicides (Models 5 through 8, respectively).
Again under classification A1, the mandatory arrest law is associated with a
reduction in IPH risk (IRR: 0.69, 95% CI: 0.57, 0.83); however, preferred
and discretionary laws are not associated with any significant impact. Under
classifications A2, B, and C, none of the laws are estimated to have an
impact on all IPH risk (Model 5). Likewise in Model 6, none of the law clas-
sifications produced estimates that suggested the laws significantly reduced
all female IPH risk; however, the estimated effect of the mandatory arrest
law under classification A1 nears significance (IRR: 0.87, 95% CI: 0.76,
1.00).
In Model 7, under classification A1, mandatory arrest laws were
estimated to significantly reduce all male IPH risk (IRR: 0.38, 95%
CI: 0.24, 0.62), but the same effect was not seen under classifications A2,
B, or C. Under classifications B and C, the preferred arrest lawwas estimated
to increase the risk of all male IPH (IRR: 1.45, 95% CI: 1.10, 1.93).
The discretionary arrest law did not have a significant impact on all male IPH
under any of the classification schemes, however, the direction of the point
estimates differed between classifications A1 and A2 and classifications
B and C.
In Model 8, the effect of the laws and law classification schemes on all
nonintimate partner homicides, produced some statistically significant
correlations. This suggests the relationships between the preferred arrest
laws under classifications B and C with IPH and its subcategories are con-
founded by a factor or factors that are both associated with the passage of
these laws andwith a decrease in nonintimate partner homicide. Such a factor
may also impact IPH, casting doubt on the results of previous models.
Discussion
This research examined whether differences in the classification of laws
governing warrantless arrests for DV affect estimates of the laws’ effects
on IPHs. To do so, we examined whether these laws, as categorized under
three classification schemes, impacted IPH risk in 46 large US cities.
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In doing this, we discovered differences in the timing of the laws between
those years of passage associated with classification A and those we
researched ourselves, prompting us to develop a fourth classification
scheme—classification A with its published timing of the laws (A1) and
classification A with our implementation dates (A2). We found that the
magnitudes, directions, and significance levels of the estimated effects of
the law constructs on IPH varied between the schemes, with the most nota-
ble differences resulting from varying the timing of the laws, leading us to
hypothesize that differences in these schemes and law timing may also
impact the estimated effects of the laws on other DV outcomes.
This conclusion represents a very real problem for the integration of
research findings, hypothesis building, and practice. To illustrate, one might
hypothesize that the increase in dual arrests found in states with mandatory
arrest laws by Hirschel et al. (2007) and the possible consequences of victim
arrest discussed earlier, such as an unwillingness to call the police for future
violent events, play a small role in the increase in IPH seen in states with
mandatory arrest laws in Iyengar’s research (2009). However, as illustrated
here, the level of agreement between the classification schemes used by
Hirschel et al. (2007) and Iyengar (2009) is troublingly low; the group of
states in which Hirschel et al. (2007) found an increase in dual arrests due
to mandatory arrest laws is not the same group of states in which Iyengar
(2009) found an increase in IPH associated with mandatory arrest laws.
The issues addressed here are construct validity and law timing.
The laws under study in this research are complex and multifaceted and the
constructs of these laws used in research need to take that complexity into
account. While the prototypical feature of these laws is thought to be the
level of discretion allowed to police officers in making the decision to
arrest, there are other provisions in these laws that may also affect whether
an arrest occurs. A reading of the literature uncovered no precisely defined
construct of these arrest laws accepted by the field at large, indeed the def-
initions found tended to be simplistic given the complexity of the laws,
leaving the assessment of which laws fit which construct murky for some
laws. For example, Louisiana’s statute states that officers shall arrest if
there is probable cause to believe a DV felony or a DV misdemeanor that
‘‘endangers the physical safety’’ of the victim occurred, however, ‘‘if there
is no cause to believe there is impending danger, arresting the abusive party
is at the officer’s discretion’’ (La. R.S. §46:2140). Likely because the law
lays out both a discretionary and a mandatory circumstance, it has been
assessed to be both a discretionary (Iyengar 2009) and a mandatory arrest
law (Hirschel et al. 2007).
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Reasons for the discrepancies in law timing between Iyengar’s (2009)
research and our own are largely unknown. As stated previously, some of
the inconsistencies may be due to differing views regarding which section
of the law referred to the police power to make a warrantless arrest. Other
discrepancies are not so easy to explain. For example, our legal research
showed that Oregon passed its mandatory arrest law in 1977 and Iyengar’s
research suggested it was passed in 2001. In fact, there are several states in
which our year of law passage differs from Iyengar’s by 5 or more years.
Due to these large discrepancies, we have fastidiously checked and
rechecked our legal research and are confident in our findings. However,
the point remains that varying the timing of the arrest laws in the statistical
models can impact the estimated effects of these laws on IPH to a large
degree.
Research suggests that differing model specifications can also impact
model results (Donohue and Wolfers 2009; Leeb and Potscher 2005).
Omitted variable bias may play a role in the estimates produced. For exam-
ple, the models do not include a measure of arrests for DV, which may be an
important component of the potentially deterrent effect of arrest. Similar to
Donohue and Wolfers’ (2009) argument that a multitude of criminal sanc-
tions should be employed as controls in research on the effects of capital
punishment, criminal sanctions for DV, such as the proportion of those
arrested who are charged, conviction rates, and severity of sentences,
should be controlled for in research on the effects of warrantless arrest laws.
Without these variables in the model, one cannot disentangle their impact
on DV outcomes from those of warrantless arrest laws. Unfortunately, these
data are simply not readily available for numerous geographic units (be they
cities, counties, or states) over lengthy study periods, greatly hampering the
ability of these models to produce unbiased results.
The results of the question ofwhethermandatory, preferred, or discretionary
arrest laws for DV affect IPH in comparison to noDV-specific arrest lawswere
mixed in our models. Mandatory arrest laws, as defined by classification A and
using Iyengar’s (2009) law timing,may reduce the risk of IPH in largeUS cities
when compared with a lack of DV-specific warrantless arrest laws. However,
these results were not replicated using classification Awith our law timing, nor
were they replicated with classifications B or C, which differed considerably
fromclassificationA.Basedon the results of this research, the authors conclude
that the inconsistency in construct explication and law assessment and timing
alone can alter the findings of research on DV outcomes.
Interestingly, the results produced here using classification A with
Iyengar’s timing are contrary to the research from which classification A
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was taken, the results of which suggested that mandatory arrest laws
increased the risk of IPH at the state level (Iyengar 2009). Some of the dif-
ference may derive from the varying designs of the two studies. This
research used a narrower sample than Iyengar, who included IPH counts
in all states. We focused, instead, on large cities in 25 states. Differential
implementation of the laws between states represented in this study and
those not included could lead to differing results. Iyengar’s hypothesized
explanation for the findings of the research, that victims are less likely to
report DV to the police in states with mandatory arrest laws because they
do not want their partners arrested, is based on the degree to which DV vic-
tims are aware of mandatory arrest laws. Mandatory arrest laws may have
been passed and implemented with a great deal of publicity in the states not
included in this research, or they may have been better publicized outside of
the urban areas represented in this study. The present research also utilized a
different reference group (no DV-specific arrest law) than the research of
Iyengar (2009; no and discretionary arrest laws), which could also account
for some of the difference in results. For each of the models, Iyengar tested
the effects of mandatory and preferred arrest laws in reference to discretion-
ary arrest laws, yet the time span covered by her research includes numer-
ous state-years with no DV warrantless arrest law in effect. Iyengar
therefore collapsed the two distinct conditions of having no law and having
a discretionary warrantless arrest law into one category. It is possible that
these two conditions have differing effects on behaviors and other factors
that may mediate IPH, making their use as a combined reference group
potentially problematic.
We strongly suggest cautionwhen interpreting the estimated effects found in
this research of mandatory, preferred, and discretionary arrest laws for DV on
IPH. The classification schemes used here produced varying estimates, bring-
ing to light the importance of consistency of meaning of the constructs and
assessment of the laws and their timing far more than shedding light on the
impacts of the laws. Furthermore, the models suffered from omitted variable
bias, as well as the well-known limitations present in the SHR data used to con-
struct our dependent variables (see, for example, Wadsworth and Roberts
2008). Complicating the matter still is the measurement of the intervention as
thepresence or absence of awarrantless arrest law, ameasurement that does not
control for whether local jurisdictions actually implement the law in practice.
This study isolated the impact of varying law classification schemes on
policy research outcomes. Unfortunately, it is difficult at best to advance
theory and practice when the construct being studied is unclear and the
manner in which its timing is modeled is inconsistent or flawed. As
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evidenced here, disagreement between the classification schemes and law
timing can lead to strikingly different estimated effects of arrest laws on
IPH. Researchers, policymakers, and advocates who are unaware of the dif-
ferences between studies may make generalizations about mandatory arrest
laws that cannot actually be supported. Researchers must be more transpar-
ent in how they defined the constructs of discretionary, recommended, and
mandatory arrest laws, and clearly show how each law was assessed, pos-
sibly addressing differences between their assessments and that of others,
and provide information on law implementation dates so that consumers are
aware of these differences and can interpret the research accordingly. While
difficulties in model specifications and available data persist, increasing the
difficulty of arriving at conclusions regarding law effects, a stepmust bemade
toward a greater understanding of DV warrantless arrest laws. Ultimately,
social science researchersmust teamwith legal scholars to clearly define these
constructs and conduct the legal research required to determine classifications
and implementation dates so that the field may advance and inform the
ongoing debate on the appropriateness and effectiveness of these laws.
Note
1. The control variable of the adult, nonintimate homicide rate was not used in the
model with the nonequivalent dependent variable of all nonintimate homicides
per city year.
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